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Abstract
In this work, we present an algorithm for the design of n× n-bits substitution boxes (S-boxes)
based on time series of a discrete dynamical system with chaotic behavior. The elements of a
n× n-bits substitution box are given by binary sequences generated by time series with uniform
distribution. Particularly, time series with uniform distribution are generated via two lag time
chaotic series of the logistic map. The aim of using these two lag time sequences is to hide the map
used, and thus U-shape distribution of the logistic map is avoided and uncorrelated S-box elements
are obtained. The algorithm proposed is simple and guarantees the generation of S-boxes, which are
the main component in block cipher, fulfill the strong S-box criteria: bijective; nonlinearity; strict
avalanche criterion; output bits independence criterion; criterion of equiprobable input/output
XOR distribution and; maximum expected linear probability. The S-boxes that fulfill these criteria
are commonly known as “good S-boxes”. Finally, an application based on polyalphabetic ciphers
principle is developed to obtain uniform distribution of the plaintext via dynamical S-boxes.
S-box; block cipher; dynamical S-Box; chaos; lag time chaotic series.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, we are in the era of informatics and due to the large number of attacks, it is important
to adequately protect the information to avoid possible misuse of it. The aforementioned comment
motivates the generation of different approaches to have secure cryptographic systems. In general
cryptosystems can be divided in two classes: stream cipher and block cipher. The stream cipher
combines bit to bit, the sequences of bits generated by plaintext and pseudorandom numbers. The
block cipher takes blocks of plaintext which are encrypted by substitution using an S-box and cyclic
shifting. The substitution box (S-box) is the core component of block cipher. The S-boxes give the
cryptosystems the confusion property described by Shannon [1], used in conventional block ciphers
such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In these
cryptosystems the security depends mainly on the S-box properties that are used. The criteria that
a strong S-box fulfill, also known as “good S-boxes”, are: bijection; nonlinearity; strict avalanche
criterion (SAC); the output bit independence criterion (BIC) [2]. Other desirable characteristics are
to be resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis attacks. The construction of cryptographically
secure S-boxes is a field of interest in the cryptography area.
In recent years, many papers have been reported and are focused on studying cryptosystems based
on chaos [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], this is, because of the relationship that exists between the chaotic
system properties and the cryptosystem properties. In [13] the relationship between these properties
are given, for instance, confusion is related with ergodicity, the diffusion property with sensitivity to
initial conditions and the deterministic dynamic with the deterministic pseudo-randomness. Taking
advantage of the properties of chaotic systems, we propose a strong and dynamic S-Box that complies
with the different criteria of good S-boxes.
Regarding the generation of S-box based on chaos, some algorithms have been developed using
discrete dynamical systems. For example, in [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], the generation of substitution boxes were
introduced through a single time series of a map or by combining two time series of different maps.
Nevertheless, these algorithms do not guarantee that the series used have a uniform distribution, as in
our approach based on two lag time chaotic series derived from the logistic map. In the same way, there
are algorithms based on continuous chaotic dynamical systems [8, 9, 10]. Also there are algorithms
based on the mixing of time series of continuous and discrete dynamical systems [11, 12] and in [14]
the algorithm is build via time-delay series. The advantage of using discrete chaotic dynamical systems
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is that from one iteration to another the elements of the time series are de-correlated, however this
does not happen if a continuous chaotic dynamical system is used, the elements of the time series are
strong correlated. Therefore, many iterations are needed and the calculation of the mutual information
between elements of the time series is necessary to be able to say when they are de-correlated, which
implies higher computational cost.
In chaos-based encryption schemes, pseudo-random sequences based on chaotic maps are generally
used as one time pad for encrypting messages. Since encryption schemes, based on low dimensional
chaotic map, have low computational complexity, they can be analyzed with low computational cost
using iteration and correlation functions [15]. Time-delay chaotic series have complex behavior and
erase the trace of the mapping that generates them. Using these aforementioned time series, S-boxes
can be designed and provide better nonlinearity criterion, that ensure good statistical properties in the
generators.
In this paper, a method to obtain dynamical good S-boxes is presented based on the generation
of lag time series from the logistic map. Using this kind of lag time series, it is possible to generate
S-boxes that have the capability of hiding the map used to build them. With this approach, based
on these lag time series, pseudo-random series are generated with good statistical properties, more
details can be found in [16]. This novel algorithm for S-box generation is based on cryptographically
secure pseudo-random number generator. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
2, the criteria for a “good” n× n bit S-box are described. In Section 3, it is presented a dynamical
analysis of logistics map. In Section 4, the proposed scheme to generate dynamical S-box based on
pseudo-random bit generator is presented. In Section 5, the performance analysis of an obtained S-box
and its comparison with other S-box reported in the literature is given. An application of the obtained
S-boxes to hide an image is presented in Section 6. Finally conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Criteria for a good n×n bit S-box
A collection of six criteria reported in the literature for generate cryptographically good S-boxes has been
made. These criteria are: bijective; nonlinearity; strict avalanche criterion; output bits independence
criterion, equiprobable input/output XOR distribution; and maximum expected linear probability.
Before addressing these properties it is necessary to give some preliminaries about Boolean functions.
Let B = {0, 1} be a binary set which is endowed with two binary operations, called addition (denoted
by ⊕ XOR operation) and multiplication (denoted by · AND operation). Let (B,⊕, ·) be a field which
will be denoted by F, where the binary operations are given by the table 1.
⊕ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
· 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
Table 1: Addition and multiplication binary operations.
An n× n S-box is a vectorial Boolean function S : Fn → Fn, where Fn is a vectorial space, and is
defined as:
(1) S(x) = (f1(x), f2(x), · · · , fn(x)),
where x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)> ∈ Fn and each of f ′is for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a Boolean function. A Boolean
function is a mapping f : Fn → F by considering all inputs in f , fi can be seen as a column vector of
2n elements. The functions f ′is are component functions of S.
Some basic definitions can be found in [17].
Definition 2.1. A Boolean function with algebraic expression, where the degree is at most one is called
an affine Boolean function. The general form for n-variable affine function is:
faffine(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) = wn · xn ⊕ wn−1 · xn−1 ⊕ . . .⊕ w2 · x2 ⊕ w1 · x1 ⊕ w0,
where wi ∈ B are coefficients, and xi ∈ B are variables, with i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
2
Definition 2.2. A linear Boolean function is defined as follows
Lw(x) = wn · xn ⊕ wn−1 · xn−1 ⊕ . . .⊕ w1 · x1,
where xi, wi ∈ B, with i = 1, . . . , n.
The set of affine Boolean functions is comprised by the set of linear Boolean functions and their
complements,i.e., all functions of the form
Aw,c(x) = Lw(x)⊕ c, c ∈ B.
A useful representation of a Boolean function fi, with i = 1, . . . , n, is given by the polarity truth
table defined as follows.
Definition 2.3. A polarity truth table is defined as follows
fˆ(x) = (−1)f(x),
where x ∈ Fn, fˆ maps the output values of the Boolean function from the set {0, 1} to the set {−1, 1},
i.e.,
fˆ : {0, 1} → {−1, 1}.
A linear Boolean function in polarity form is denoted as Lˆw(x).
Definition 2.4. The Walsh Hadamard transform (WHT) of a Boolean function f is defined as
Fˆf (w) =
∑
x∈Bn
fˆ(x)Lˆw(x).
The WHT measures the correlation between the Boolean function f and the linear Boolean function
Lˆw with x ∈ Fn.
2.1 Bijective Criterion
Let S(x) be an S-box, which is bijective if and only if their Boolean functions fi satisfy the following
condition:
(2) wt(a1 · f1 ⊕ a2 · f2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an · fn) = 2n−1,
where ai ∈ F, (a1, a2, · · · , an) 6= (0, 0, · · · , 0) and wt(·) is the Hamming weight [2, 18], the corre-
sponding S-box is guaranteed to be bijective.
2.2 Nonlinearity criterion
Definition 2.5. [19] The nonlinearity of a Boolean function f : Fn → F is denoted by
(3) Nf = min
l∈Aw,c(x)
dH(f, l),
where Aw,c(x) is an affine function set, dH(f, l) is the Hamming distance between f and l.
The minimum distance between two Boolean functions can be described by means of the Walsh
spectrum [20]:
(4) min
l∈Aw,c(x)
dH(f, l) = 2
n−1(1− 2−n max
ω∈Fn
|Sˆ(f)(ω)|),
where the Walsh spectrum of f(x) is defined as follows:
(5) Sˆ(f)(ω) = |Fˆf (w)|w∈Bn =
∑
x∈Fn
(−1)f(x)⊕x•ω,
with ω ∈ Fn and x • ω is the dot product between x and ω as:
(6) x • ω = x1 · ω1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn · ωn.
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2.3 Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC)
This criterion was first introduced by Webster and Tavares [21]. A Boolean function f satisfies SAC if
complementing any single input bit changes the output bit with the probability one half. So, more
formally, a Boolean function f satisfies SAC, if and only if
(7)
∑
x∈Fn
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ ei) = 2n−1, ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where ei ∈ Fn such that wt(ei) = 1.
2.4 Output Bits Independence Criterion (BIC)
Output Bit Independence Criterion is another desirable criterion for an S-box that should be satisfied,
introduced by Webster and Tavares [21]. It means that all the avalanche variables should be pairwise
independent for a given set of avalanche vectors generated by the complementing of a single plaintext
bit.
Adam and Tavares introduced another method to measure the BIC that for the Boolean functions,
fi and fj (i 6= j) of two output bits in a S-box, if fi ⊕ fj is highly nonlinear and come as close as
possible to satisfy SAC [2]. Additionally, fi ⊕ fj can be tested with a Dynamic Distance (DD). The
DD of a function f can be defined as:
(8) DD(f) = max
d∈Fn
wt(d)=1
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣2n−1 −
2n−1∑
x=0
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ d)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
If the value of DD is a small integer and close to zero, the function f satisfies the SAC.
2.5 Criterion of equiprobable Input/Output XOR Distribution
Biham and Shamir [22] introduced differential cryptanalysis which attacks S-boxes faster than brute-
force attack. It is desirable for an S-box to have differential uniformity. This can be measured by the
maximum expected differential probability (MEDP). Differential probability for a given map S can be
calculated by measuring differential resistance and is defined as follows:
(9) DPf = max
∆x 6=0,∆y
(
#{x ∈ Fn|S(x)⊕ S(x⊕∆x) = ∆y}
2m
)
,
where 2n is the cardinality of all the possible input values (x), ∆x and ∆y are called input and output
differences, respectively, for the S. Thus, the smaller value of DPf gives better cryptographic property,
i.e., its resistance to differential cryptanalysis.
2.6 Maximum Expected Linear Probability
The Maximum Expected Linear Probability (MELP) is the maximum value of the unbalance of an
event. Given two randomly selected masks a and b, and a is used to calculate the mask of all possible
values of an input x, and use b to calculate the mask of the output values of the corresponding S-box.
The parity of the input bits mask a is equal to the parity of the output bits the mask b. MELP of a
given S-box can be computed by the following equation:
(10) LPf = max
a,b∈Fn\{0}
(
2−n
∑
x∈Fn
(−1)a·x+b·f(x)
)2
.
The closer is MELP to zero, the higher the resistance against linear cryptanalysis attack will be.
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3 Analysis of the Logistic map
The logistic map is a discrete-time demographic model analogous to the logistic equation first created
by Pierre FranA˜§ois Verhulst, which is described by the following differential equation
dx
dt
= rx
(
1− x
K
)
,
where x is the state variable of the system, r is a parameter related with the rate of maximum population
growth and K is the so-called carrying capacity (i.e., the maximum sustainable population). So x ≤ K,
when x = K the population stops growing. Robert May [23] popularized this differential equation to
one of the most famous discrete dynamical systems, the logistic map, which is defined as follows:
(11) fα(xi) = αxi(1− xi),
where x is the state variable of the logistic map and, α is the only parameter of the system instead of
two as its analogous continuous model. The use of a single parameter was possible because the logistic
map was normalized, i.e., fα : [0, 1] → [0, 1], for the bifurcation parameter α ∈ [0, 4] and x0 ∈ [0, 1].
Nevertheless, in the context of mathematics, the values of the parameter α are not restricted to the
interval [0, 4], so mathematically, it is possible to consider negative values [24]. As mentioned above,
the logistic map is now studied in the interval [−2, 0) for cryptographic purposes. Now, we study the
mapping behavior in the two intervals and they assured with α ∈ [−2, 4] the orbits do not scape to
infinity for some initial conditions.
Figure 1: Fixed points stability where an asterisk and a circle denote repulsive and attracting fixed
points, respectively.
The dynamical system (11) presents one or two fixed points located at x∗1 = 0 and at x
∗
2 =
α−1
α ,
for α 6= 0. Figure 1 depicts the stability of the fixed points where an asterisk and a circle denote
repulsive and attracting fixed points, respectively. These fixed points change their stability according
to the parameter α, i.e., when |f ′(x∗1)| < 1 and |f ′(x∗2)| < 1 then the fixed points x∗1 and x∗2 are
stable, respectively, and they are unstable when |f ′(x∗1)| > 1 and |f ′(x∗2)| > 1. We are interested in
the last case because the system presents complex behavior, this is, both fixed points are repulsive,
|f ′(x∗1)| = |α| > 1 and |f ′(x∗2)| = | − α+ 2| > 1. The x∗1 fixed point is repulsive for α < −1 and α > 1.
On the other hand, the x∗2 fixed point is repulsive for α < 1 but α 6= 0, and α > 3. So the interested
values are α ∈ [−2,−1] ∪ [3, 4], this is the condition to have both repulsive fixed points.
The dynamical system (11) bifurcates when |f ′(x∗1)| = 1 and |f ′(x∗2)| = 1, this happens for x∗1 when
α = −1 or 1, and for x∗2 the bifurcations values are given by α = 1 and 3. It is possible to analyze the
behavior of the system by means of a bifurcation diagram, which is shown in Figure 2. This diagram
shows orbits as a function of α parameter and the route to chaos are period-doubling bifurcations at
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram for the logistic map given by Eq. (11).
α = 3 and period-halving bifurcations at α = −1. There are intervals for the parameter α near to −2
and 4 where the logistic map fα(x) behaves chaotically.
Figure 3: Lyapunov exponent as a function of parameter α.
There are several approaches to demonstrate that a system is chaotic, one of them is prove that
the dynamical systems fulfills the definition given by Devaney [25], other approach is based on the
Lyapunov exponent [26],[27]. In the same sense, the Lyapunov exponent of Eq. 11 it is shown in Fig.
3. The graph of Lyapunov exponents is symmetric with respect to α = 1, the chaotic behavior of the
logistic map appears for values of the parameter α near −2 and 4. The local stability of the fixed points
are in accordance with the Lyapunov exponent values, for example, when α ∈ (−1, 3) the orbits of the
system converge at a fixed point and, when the bifurcations occurs the orbits converge at periodic
orbits up to chaos appears.
The aim is to use the logistic map to generate a time series with uniform distribution and without
evidencing the mapping used. To achieve this, it is proposed an approach based on two chaotic time
series of the logistic map. Based on Lyapunov exponents analysis, the α values are arbitrarily selected
within the chaos region, so it is consider α = −2 and 4. In Figure 4 is presented the shape of the logistic
6
Figure 4: Logistic map for α = −2 in blue triangles and for α = 4 in black crosses.
map for both parameter values α = −2 and α = 4 in blue triangles and in black crosses, respectively.
The logistic map for these parameter values is invariant in different intervals as follows
(12)
f−2 : [−0.5, 1.5]→ [−0.5, 1.5];
f4 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
It is worth saying that the time series generated with both parameter values have a U-shape distribution.
4 Proposed algorithm to generate dynamical S-boxes
The main idea of the proposed algorithm to generate dynamical S-boxes is based on a Cryptographically
Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG) via a discrete dynamical system fα : I → I.
Garc´ıa Mart´ınez and Campos Canto´n [16] proposed a CSPRNG using two lag time series generated
with the logistic map (11).
An orbit x0, x1, x2, . . . of the logistic map (11) is defined by giving an initial condition x0 ∈ I.
The interval I is determined by the parameter α ∈ {−2, 4}, fα : I → I. Let M1 and M2 two time
series generated with the logistic map by means of the following considerations: i) given two arbitrary
initial conditions x01, x02, such that, x01 6= x02; ii) two different bifurcation parameters α1 and α2;
and iii) l-units of memory for each time series x(i−kl−1)1, . . ., x(i−k2)1, x(i−k1)1, xi1 and x(i−kl−1)1, . . .,
x(i−k′2)2, x(i−k′1)2, xi2. So the orbits have uniform distribution independently the U-shape distribution
of the logistic map. In order to illustrate the algorithm, we have chosen the bifurcation parameter
values as α1 = −2 and α2 = 4 for the time series M1 and M2, respectively. These parameter values
ensure that the system (11) has chaotic behavior in both cases.
To guarantee that the generator will present good statistical properties is necessary to generate
time series with uniform distribution and also it is desirable to eliminate the logistic map shape in
these new time series. This is achieved by means of the number of lags involved. There are a lot of
combinations of delays that are able to de-correlate the shape of the logistic map and the time series,
but each delay unit needs memory and processing time.
If we analyze time series M2 = m02,m12,m22, . . . with two memory units, for α = 4. The elements
mi2 of the time series M2(x(i−k1)2, xi2) are obtained in the following way:
(13) mi2 = M2(x(i−k1)2, xi2) = x(i−k1)2 + xi2,mod 1,
where k1 = 5. In the plot of m(n−1)2 against mn2, it is possible to distinguish that the time series M2
are generated with the logistic map. Figure 5 shows (m(n−1)2,mn2) using two memory units. Because
the length of the delay does not matter, the shape of the logistic map always remains, so it is necessary
to consider more memory units.
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Figure 5: (m(n−1)2,mn2) from the time series M2(x(i−k1)2, xi2) considering two memory units.
Figure 6: (m(n−1)2,mn2) from the time series M2(x(i−k2)2, x(i−k1)2, xi2) considering three memory
units.
Now, if we consider three memory units to obtain the elements of the time seriesM2(x(i−k2)2, x(i−k1)2, xi2)
given as follows
(14) mi2 = M2(x(i−k2)2, x(i−k1)2, xi2) = x(i−k2)2 + x(i−k1)2 + xi2,mod 1,
where k1 = 10 and k2 = 5. Now, for this case of three memory units, which are the minimum
amount to obtain cloud of points in (m(n−1)2,mn2), see Figure 6. The shape of the logistic map almost
disappears, so three memory units are enough. The problem with considering more memory units has
a computational price of information storage. For this reason two delays k1 and k2 and the present
state of the time series of the logistic map are used. Also the lags must not be contiguous in order to
avoid regular patterns which directly affect the test results.
It is considered different delays, i.e., k2 = k
′
2 = 10, k1 = 6 and k
′
1 = 5 for both time series M1 and
M2. Thus, these series are conformed by the sum of two delay states x(i−10)1 and x(i−5)1 with the actual
state xi1 of the orbit x01, x11, x21, . . ., for M1. In the same way for M2, x(i−10)2, x(i−6)2 and xi2 of the
orbit x02, x12, x22, . . .. The values of the time series are limited by the operation mod 1, this guarantees
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that M1,M2 ∈ [0, 1) ⊂ <. Explicitly M1(x(i−10)1, x(i−5)1, xi1) and M2(x(i−10)2, x(i−6)2, xi2) are
expressed in the following way:
mi1 = M1(x(i−10)1, x(i−5)1, xi1) = x(i−10)1 + x(i−5)1 + xi1,mod 1,(15)
mi2 = M2(x(i−10)2, x(i−6)2, xi2) = x(i−10)2 + x(i−6)2 + xi2,mod 1.(16)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7: (a) Logistic map given by xn against xn−1; (b) “U-shaped” probability distribution of the
logistic map; (c) Delayed map given by zn against zn−1; (d) Uniform probability distribution of the
delayed map.
Finally, these time series M1 = m01,m11,m21, . . . and M2 = m02,m12,m22, . . . given by (15) and
(16), respectively, are mixed and the operation mod 1 is applied again, this process generates a new
time series Zi given as follows:
(17) Zi = mi1 +mi2,mod 1.
From now on, Eq. (17) is referred as the delayed map. Note that Zi ∈ [0, 1) ⊂ <. The aim to
use this approach is that with the combination of two time series with delays represented by Zi, it is
possible to dismiss the structure of the chaotic map used. For instance, the time series xn can reveal
the map whether xn against xn−1 is plotted as is shown in Figure 7 (a), the logistic map appears. In
contrast, the time series zn can not reveal the map whether zn against zn−1 is plotted as is shown in
Figure 7 (c), the delays used are not reveled neither does the logistic map appear. As well as, this
allows us to change the characteristic “U-shaped” probability distribution [28] by a uniform probability
distribution in the obtained time series xn and zn, see Figure 7 (b) and (d), respectively. This is an
important characteristic that, in comparison with the chaos based schemes approach, makes easier the
construction of S-box since all values has the same probability of occurrence in contrast with a single
chaotic based schemes.
To obtain a binary time series s useful for cryptosystems, it is constructed the symbolic dynamics
of Zi. So the elements of s are binary numbers, i.e., si(Zi) ∈ {0, 1}. One necessary requirement for the
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symbolic dynamic is to obtain zeros or ones with the same probability, thus the process for getting the
binary series is as follows:
(18) si =
{
0, for 0 < Zi ≤ 0.5,
1, for 0.5 < Zi < 1.
A CSPRNG based on a discrete dynamical system is given from equations (11) to (18).
4.1 The algorithm for s-box design via CSPRNG
In this subsection, we propose a novel design algorithm for the creation of n × n S-boxes based on
CSPRNG. The steps of the algorithm are simple as shown below.
Step 1 Select initial conditions x01 and x02 for CSPRNG in order to generate the stream of bits
s0, s1, s2, . . .
Step 2 Generate the block sequence of n-bits each, C0 = (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1), C1 = (sn, sn+1, . . . , s2n−1),
C2 = (s2n, s2n+1, . . . , s3n−1), . . .
Step 3 Convert the blocks C0, C1, C2, . . . of n-bits to integer numbers D0, D1, D2,. . ..
Step 4 Discard the repeated elements D’s to select 2n different values. The rule to discard an element
is as follows: if Di = Dj with i < j then discard Dj .
Step 5 Create the S-Box with the 2n different elements of D’s.
Once the procedure is over, the proposed algorithm returns a n× n S-box with distinct 2n values.
Note that D0 is the first element of the S-box, but the second element could be not D1 if D0 = D1.
However, has been generated the enough 2n elements to build the S-box. Each block C’s is comprised
by n bits, sj , sj+1, . . . , sj+n−1, which are related with the functions fi, with i = 1, . . . , n.
For example, if n = 8, x01 = 0.8147, x02 = 0.9058, α1 = 4 and α2 = −2 then the 8 × 8 S-Box is
obtained in Table 2. This proposed substitution box has the properties of confusion and diffusion,
which are of vital importance for the block ciphers.
64 46 150 174 220 26 233 224 148 170 143 247 225 212 90 124
44 204 59 61 43 121 129 2 109 164 103 249 16 237 27 35
216 184 81 213 161 169 89 199 140 38 239 48 163 193 21 147
222 217 70 196 195 192 234 41 47 15 14 42 98 190 186 36
242 51 60 87 24 104 189 55 118 111 231 120 8 226 7 141
85 9 73 101 3 197 12 66 82 110 65 25 165 176 80 181
125 31 218 74 68 52 149 95 182 19 112 5 136 79 214 34
158 50 188 137 28 191 155 84 105 126 92 179 162 152 200 0
171 142 240 203 88 160 32 202 99 18 100 97 145 53 194 93
245 119 185 20 235 123 134 139 128 116 173 76 17 132 209 135
83 168 57 56 223 30 91 4 22 122 102 221 208 131 71 86
39 114 252 10 172 201 177 77 94 246 54 175 183 108 156 45
219 210 40 130 113 153 13 166 58 23 253 215 238 33 198 248
229 227 96 206 107 144 67 254 115 167 244 106 180 157 255 241
207 243 228 187 49 78 251 37 62 1 205 117 29 178 75 236
11 250 146 6 151 69 138 133 72 232 211 127 159 63 154 230
Table 2: The S-box generated by proposed algorithm.
In the next section, is examined the performances of the proposed algorithm for the generation of
S-Boxes to confirm their immunity especially against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
5 Performance test of S-box
In this section we compute six important and well-known cryptographic criteria of the 8× 8 S-boxes.
Lastly, we present our results which are contrasted with some results presented in different published
papers using other approaches.
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5.1 Bijectivity criterion
The computed value of proposed S-box is the desired value of 2n−1 = 128, with n = 8, according to the
formula (2). So the bijectivity criterion is satisfied and the S-box proposed is a one-to-one, surjective
and balance; which is a primary cryptographic criterion.
5.2 Nonlinearity Criterion
Nonlinearity is the major requirement of any S-box design due to ensure that an S-box is not a
linear function between input vectors and output vectors. The nonlinearity symbolizes the degree of
dissimilarity between the Boolean function f and n-bit linear function l. If the function have high
minimum Hamming distance is said to have high nonlinearity, i.e., by reducing the Walsh spectrum
in (4). A S-box contains n Boolean functions and the nonlinearity of each Boolean function must be
calculated. The nonlinearities of the proposed S-box are 104, 104, 102, 104, 96, 102, 100 and 102,
respectively. High nonlinearity ensures the strongest ability to resist powerful modern attacks such as
linear cryptanalysis.
5.3 Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC)
The Avalanche effect is used to indicate the randomness of an S-box when an input has a change.
The matrix of the generated S-box can be found in Table 3. For the S-box proposed, it is obtained a
maximum SAC equal to 0.5781, the minimum is 0.3906, and its average value 0.5012 is close to the
desired value 0.5. Based on these results, it can be concluded that the S-box generated by our proposed
method fulfills the property of SAC.
0.5781 0.4844 0.5000 0.4219 0.4844 0.5156 0.4063 0.5469
0.5156 0.5000 0.4688 0.5156 0.5469 0.3906 0.5469 0.4375
0.5469 0.5000 0.5000 0.5469 0.4063 0.5156 0.4531 0.5313
0.4531 0.5156 0.5000 0.4531 0.5313 0.5313 0.4844 0.4688
0.5156 0.5469 0.4844 0.5313 0.5313 0.5625 0.5625 0.5469
0.4063 0.4844 0.5000 0.4063 0.5625 0.5625 0.4844 0.5313
0.4219 0.4063 0.5313 0.5313 0.4219 0.5625 0.4844 0.4844
0.5469 0.5156 0.5469 0.5625 0.4531 0.5625 0.5781 0.4531
Table 3: SAC criterion result of the generated S-box.
5.4 Output Bits Independence Criterion (BIC)
The BIC criterion guarantees that there is no statistic pattern or dependency between output vectors.
The BIC of the S-box generated by the proposed method is tested as described in Subsection 2.4, the
results obtained are shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The mean value of BIC-nonlinearity is 103.8571,
the mean value of BIC-SAC is 0.5066 and maximum value of DD is 8 which indicates that S-box
approximately satisfies the BIC criterion.
0 104 104 106 104 106 106 102
104 0 106 98 102 104 102 104
104 106 0 104 102 96 104 104
106 98 104 0 106 100 106 104
104 102 102 106 0 102 100 102
106 104 96 100 102 0 104 108
106 102 104 106 100 104 0 106
102 104 104 104 102 108 106 0
Table 4: BIC-nonlinearity criterion result of the generated S-box.
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0 0.5020 0.5176 0.5137 0.5293 0.5098 0.4727 0.5059
0.5020 0 0.4980 0.4844 0.5039 0.5313 0.5156 0.5000
0.5176 0.4980 0 0.5039 0.4941 0.5313 0.5000 0.5020
0.5137 0.4844 0.5039 0 0.5117 0.4980 0.5020 0.5020
0.5293 0.5039 0.4941 0.5117 0 0.5234 0.5000 0.5137
0.5098 0.5313 0.5313 0.4980 0.5234 0 0.5039 0.5000
0.4727 0.5156 0.5000 0.5020 0.5000 0.5039 0 0.5156
0.5059 0.5000 0.5020 0.5020 0.5137 0.5000 0.5156 0
Table 5: BIC-SAC criterion result of the generated S-box.
0 2 6 2 4 6 4 6
2 0 2 2 2 2 4 2
6 2 0 6 8 2 6 4
2 2 6 0 4 2 8 4
4 2 8 4 0 2 0 2
6 2 2 2 2 0 2 8
4 4 6 8 0 2 0 0
6 2 4 4 2 8 0 0
Table 6: The DD of the generated S-box (BIC–SAC criterion).
5.5 Criterion of equiprobable Input/Output XOR Distribution
The equiprobable Input/Output XOR Distribution is a criterion which analyzes the effect in particular
differences in input pairs of the resultant output pairs to discover the key bits. The idea is to find
the high probability difference pairs for an S-Box under attack. The equiprobable input/output
XOR distribution of generated S-box calculated by (12) is presented in Table 7. Maximal value of
S-box generated by the proposed method is 5, which indicates that our S-box satisfies bound for the
equiprobable Input/Output XOR Distribution criterion.
4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3
4 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 3 2 3 3
5 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 5 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 4 4 3 5 4 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 3
3 2 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 5 5 3 3 4 3 4 3 2 5 3 3 3
3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 3
4 3 4 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 4 4 3 3
4 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3
3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 5 4 5 4 3 3 5 3 3 4 3 5 -
Table 7: Equiprobable Input/Output XOR Distribution approach table for the generated S-box.
5.6 MELP criterion of the generated S-box
The MELP value is calculated via linear approximations to model nonlinear steps. The final goal is
to recover the key bits or part of the key bits. MELP studies the statistical correlation between the
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input and the output. This criterion of proposed S-Box is computed according to equation (9) and the
average value is 0.0176.
5.7 Comparative results
In this section a performance comparison of the S-box created using the algorithm described in
Subsection 4.1 is presented. In the Table 8 the criteria values for our S-box and a set of widely known
boxes (standard and chaos based S-box) are shown. From this Table 8, it can be seen that the generated
S-box fulfills the most important condition, bijectivity, and accomplish a good similarity to the rest of
the test values expected [3, 7, 10, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. Mainly it shows better performance
in the tests related to attacks (MELP and equiprobable Input/Output XOR Distribution). Also is a
methodology based on a system with simple operations that generates sequences with complex behavior.
Bijective
Nonlinearity SAC BIC
I/O XOR MELP
min max avg min max avg SAC Nonlinearity DD
Skipjack S-Box [37] 123 100 108 105.1250 0.3906 0.5938 0.5027 0.5003 104.03 109 0.0469 0.0137
APA S-Box [29] 128 112 112 112 0.4375 0.5625 0.5007 0.4997 112 112 0.0156 0.0039
Gray S-Box [30] 128 112 112 112 0.4375 0.5625 0.4998 0.5026 112 112 0.0156 0.0039
AES S-Box [31] 128 112 112 112 0.4531 0.5625 0.5049 0.5046 112 112 0.0156 0.0039
Ref. [3] 128 98 107 103.25 0.3828 0.5938 0.5059 0.5033 104.21 108 0.0469 0.0166
Ref. [32] 129 103 109 104.875 0.3984 0.5703 0.4966 0.5044 102.96 109 0.0391 0.0176
Ref. [33] 128 96 106 103 0.3906 0.6250 0.5039 0.5010 100.35 106 0.5000 0.0220
Ref. [34] 128 112 112 112 0.4219 0.5469 0.5115 0.4982 108.71 112 0.0313 0.0120
Ref. [7] 128 102 108 105.25 0.4375 0.5781 0.5056 0.5019 103.78 108 0.0391 0.0244
Ref. [10] 128 104 110 106.25 0.4219 0.5938 0.5039 0.5059 103.35 108 0.0391 0.0198
Ref. [35] 128 102 108 106 0.4219 0.5938 0.5002 0.5016 104.42 108 0.0391 0.0220
Ref. [36]-1 128 106 108 106.75 0.3906 0.6094 0.4941 0.5013 104.28 108 0.0391 0.0156
Ref. [36]-2 128 106 108 106.75 0.4063 0.5938 0.4971 0.5008 102.92 106 0.0391 0.0198
The proposed S-box 128 96 104 101.75 0.3906 0.5781 0.5012 0.5066 103.42 108 0.0391 0.0176
Table 8: Comparison of recent chaos-base designed S-Boxes and S-boxes used in typical block ciphers.
6 Dynamical generation of S-boxes and its application
The Alberti cipher was one of the first polyalphabetic ciphers where the principle is based on substitution,
using multiple substitution alphabets such that the output has a uniform distribution. Taking this
idea of polyalphabetic ciphers, it is presented an application of dynamical generation of S-boxes, i.e.,
a particular intensity of a pixel given can be substituted by different intensities in the same round.
Usually an S-box is used to substitute all the pixels of an image of size p× q in the same way. The
idea of polyalphabetic ciphers is to use a dynamical S-box to achieve this aim looking for a uniform
distribution. For instance, our dynamical S-box belongs to a class of S-boxes given by p elements
(S-boxes) generated by the algorithm presented in the Subsection 4.1. The approach to get uniform
distribution is given by applying dynamical S-box which changes with each pixel row, i.e., the dynamical
S-box is modified with a different S-box. Figure 8 shows the original Lena image and the codified Lena
image alone with their gray scale pixels distribution.
In crypthography a uniform distribution is always desired, since this property was achieved by
simple substitution of our S-boxes, a good result is spected for a full cryptographic algorithm based on
our S-boxes.
It is important to point out that this is not an encryption algorithm, but a simple and useful
approach intended to bring to light possible applications of our dynamical S-boxes.
7 Concluding remarks
In this work, a simple algorithm was proposed to generate n× n S-boxes by means of using a pseudo-
random bit generator (PRBG) based on two lag time series of the logistic map. The mixed of this
two time series favors a uniform distribution in addition to hide the chaotic map used. To evaluate
performance of the proposed S-box, several statistical tests were carried out. The results of numerical
analysis of these cryptographic strong S-box generated by the algorithm have also shown that all criteria
for a good S-box were fulfilled and with high immunity to resist differential cryptanalysis and linear
cryptanalysis. The performance test result was compared with other S-Boxes which were reported in
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8: Plain image of Lena, encrypted image and their histograms.
the literature. Finally, an application based on simple and useful approach to bring uniform distribution
was presented.
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